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Abstract 
We investigate the long term employment outcomes of Italian injured workers over a time period when the coun-
try introduced policy reforms that increased labor market flexibility but reduced job security. Using an employer-
employee database matched with injury data, we observe that both before and after the reforms almost one-fourth 
of injured workers were no longer employed 3 years after their “first” return to work. We note a slight decrease in this 
share after the reforms (from 24 to 22%) while we find a decline in workers’ job security as measured by their probabil-
ity of re-employment in permanent contracts. We use multinomial logit estimates to study how liberalization reforms 
were associated with a changing role of individual, firm, and injury characteristics in shaping long-term employment 
outcomes of injured workers after their recovery period. Heterogeneity analyses show that low wage employees, 
women, immigrants, and individuals who suffered a more severe injury were penalized more. Pre-injury individual 
characteristics became stronger predictors of long-term employment than firms’ characteristics. In particular, we find 
that the advantage provided by working in larger firms was significant before the liberalization reforms, but disap-
peared afterward, while the advantage provided by human capital became more relevant after the liberalization.
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1 Introduction
In Italy the cost of occupational injuries in 2007 was esti-
mated to be equal to 2.63% of the national GDP. One-
third was attributable to safety investments and actions 
initiated by firms to prevent injuries. The remaining 27 
billion euros were attributable to medical or indemnity 
costs incurred by national agencies, to production and 
adjustment costs sustained by employers, and to pro-
ductivity losses or legal expenses faced by workers and 
their families (INAIL 2011). Across countries, all these 
expenses are known to be function of injury severity, 
and of the length of the time to recover and to return to 
work (RTW). Hence the extensive research to identify 
best practices that can speed the RTW process and the 
implementation of policies to facilitate it and enhance 
injured workers’ employment (Clayton et  al. 2012; Barr 
et al. 2010).
However, the meaning of successful RTW may vary 
across stakeholders (Young et  al. 2005b; Leyshon and 
Shaw 2012). While for the insurance agency it may sig-
nify the end of disability payments, for employers it may 
indicate the time when productivity is fully restored. For 
workers it is likely to mean not only reentry to work but 
also ability to keep the job, the pre-injury wage, and to 
further advance in career (Young et  al. 2005a). In this 
context, the seminal study by Butler et  al. (1995) high-
lighted that the research focus on workers’ first RTW can 
produce a very misleading picture. It does not capture the 
real post-injury employment dynamics, as many injured 
workers fail to return to stable employment after their 
day of maximum medical improvement, and instead drop 
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off the labor force, or experience unemployment or new 
disability spells.
Given such emerged research focus on injuries’ longer 
term employment outcomes, it is surprising that the lit-
erature has neglected the role played by existing labor 
market regulations. A handful of studies has examined 
whether differences in national disabilities policies (ben-
efit generosity and eligibility requirements) contributes 
to different degrees of sustainable RTW (Anema et  al. 
2009; Barr et  al. 2010; Collie et  al. 2016; Burkhauser 
et  al. 2016). However, to the best of our knowledge, to 
date no economic analysis has explored whether longer 
term employment patterns can also be associated with 
changes in national labor market regulations such as the 
ones introduced in several European countries since the 
1990s to increase labor market flexibility. Our objective is 
to cast some light on such neglected topic. Liberalization 
reforms were introduced through interventions “at the 
margin” that facilitated and induced the creation of new 
more flexible contracts. However, the reforms had wider 
effects that changed the entire labor market function-
ing. They had a detrimental effect on workers’ bargaining 
power (Ciminelli et  al. 2018) and played a role in exac-
erbating inequalities in the labor market (Barbieri and 
Cutuli 2016). They triggered demand side responses in 
terms of job openings and personnel recruitment which 
changed the context and the perspectives also of incum-
bent, permanent workers. Given such background, we 
want to investigate how such changed institutional envi-
ronment framed the long term employment experience 
of injured workers. We research this in an institutional 
setting that differs greatly from the North American 
labor market that has been the object of most existing 
economic studies about injured workers’ RTW. In fact, in 
Italy injured workers are guaranteed “de facto” full wage 
compensation while off work, and this scenario changes 
the incentives to potentially speed the return to employ-
ment (Galizzi et al. 2016).
We exploit a large administrative database on work 
and injury histories in Italy to describe how long term 
employment outcomes (up to 36  months after the end 
of the recovery period) of injured workers evolved over 
10  years when important labor market liberalization 
reforms were implemented (in 1998–2001). Such reforms 
aimed at introducing greater flexibility for employers 
and more employment opportunities for workers, but 
they were implemented in a heterogeneous way, affecting 
particularly those individuals who were already less pro-
tected before the reforms and bringing about or worsen-
ing a situation of great job insecurity for many sections 
of the Italian workforce (Berton et al. 2012; Barbieri and 
Scherer 2009). We examine whether such heterogene-
ous consequences were observable also among injured 
workers’ long term employment patterns, in particular in 
terms of differences in ability to maintain their pre-injury 
employment and contractual status. We investigate 
whether different outcomes characterized injured work-
ers whose pre injury employment characteristics (human 
capital accumulation, firm’s size) were more likely to offer 
“protection” from the effects of the liberalization reforms. 
We also explore whether employment outcomes differed 
for the traditionally most vulnerable groups of workers 
(temporary workers, women and immigrants).
To be more specific, we estimate the probability of dif-
ferent employment outcomes conditional on a rich set of 
controls, and compute the predicted probabilities of each 
outcome in years before, during and after the reform 
period. Since the policy change did not target a particu-
lar segment of the labor market, all workers saw their 
long term employment outcomes potentially affected by 
the reforms. Hence, we cannot identify a control group 
to assess the causal impact of the reforms on the levels 
of the estimated probabilities for workers in specific con-
tractual groups.1 Then, our identification strategy relies 
on comparing the differences in the employment prob-
abilities driven by several individual, firm, and injury 
characteristics, and studying whether the reforms were 
associated with a change in these differences across all 
workers. What we observe is that there were many prob-
abilities trends that were in action before the reforms. 
Such trends were similar but separated (parallel) across 
the observed characteristics. However, we find meaning-
ful departures from such parallel trends after the reforms. 
In particular, we find that the advantage provided by 
higher employment protection (EPL)-measured by firms’ 
size—in securing a successful outcome was significant 
before the liberalization reforms but is nonexistent after-
ward; while the advantage provided by human capital 
accumulation (HC)- measured by wages—increases in 
magnitude after the liberalization reforms.
Our study is organized as follow: in Sect. 2 we discuss 
the related literature, our research hypotheses about the 
“protective role” of some firms and individual attributes, 
and their testable implications; in Sect. 3 we describe the 
Italian relevant institutional setting and its evolution over 
time with specific attention to labor market deregulation. 
Section 4 addresses data, sample selection and methodo-
logical issues. Section  5 presents our estimated results, 
robustness checks and comparisons with not-injured 
1 At the same time, policy changes took place over several years and were 
concurrent with an economic slowdown (1999–2000), and with reforms 
in both the workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance systems 
(see section below). This precludes us from using also a before-after strategy 
(exploiting, for example, interrupted time series) to assess a clear-cut causal 
effect of the reforms on the probabilities of different employment outcomes.
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workers. Finally, Sect.  6 includes a discussion of our 
results and our conclusions.
2  Related literature and theoretical background
Our aim is to describe how the long term RTW patterns 
of injured workers evolved over years characterized by 
labor market liberalization. Therefore, we build on two 
quite separate strands of economics literature, i.e. the 
one that has analyzed the conditions favoring a success-
ful RTW and the one that has focused on the effects of 
labor market deregulation on the overall functioning of 
the labor market.
2.1  About RTW 
The RTW literature has shown that what seems a rela-
tively simple chain of events (some workers get injured 
on the job, take time off work to heal, and return to work) 
disguises several complexities. Workers, firms, insurance 
agencies, government agencies, they all may face align-
ing or conflicting incentives in facilitating this process 
(Boden and Galizzi 2017). Workers’ demographics, firms’ 
attributes, injury characteristics and workers’ compensa-
tion rules about eligibility, generosity, and length of dis-
ability payment will also affect it (Anema et al. 2009; Barr 
et  al. 2010; Collie et  al. 2016). Regulations and norms 
about disabilities accommodation may play also a large 
role (Anema et al. 2009; Clayton et al. 2012; Gailey and 
Seabury 2010). Hence, the rich literature that over the last 
30 years has studied the different factors that may facili-
tate workers’ return to productive employment (Krause 
et  al. 2001; Cullen 2018). However, workers’ RTW may 
not represent the end of the chain of events ignited by 
the incident. A first RTW may be followed by additional 
spells of employment or changes in employers, or by 
new occupational injuries, or lead to labor force separa-
tion (Butler et al. 1995; Krause et al. 2001; Bültmann et al. 
2007; Côté et  al. 2008; Vogel et  al. 2011; Berecki-Gisolf 
et al. 2012; Galizzi 2013; Biering et al. 2013; Young 2014). 
All these additional developments are then one more 
time affected by the severity and degree of full recovery 
from the injury (Côté et al. 2008); by workers’ pre injury 
characteristics (Galizzi 2013); by firms’ ability to provide 
accommodation(Høgelund and Holm 2014), and poten-
tial retaliation against the injured worker (Strunin and 
Boden 2004). Given the focus of our research about the 
potential role played by EPL and HC, it is also important 
to note that these additional longer term employment 
outcomes can be affected by workers’ attachment to the 
job, earnings, and job status (Awang et  al. 2016; Gal-
izzi et  al. 2016; Seing et  al. 2015). For example, García-
Serrano et  al. (2010) show that highly flexible workers 
return to work earlier than others, ceteris paribus, pos-
sibly jeopardizing their health and future employability. 
Overall cyclical economic conditions and tightness of 
the labor market also play a role (Institute for Work & 
Health 2009). Therefore, it is quite plausible that after a 
first RTW, a worker’s rights and opportunities to remain 
employed and to have access to good jobs will be asso-
ciated with the more general labor laws and regulations 
that characterize each country, and, within each country, 
different sectors or firms.
2.2  About deregulation
Recent studies have shown that labor market deregula-
tions introduced in several countries since the early 1990s 
to increase productivity and employment has reduced 
the share of labor income at the macroeconomic level 
(Ciminelli et  al. 2018) and increased inequalities (Bar-
bieri and Cutuli 2016). The literature also highlights that, 
when reducing employment protection legislation (EPL), 
workers’ mobility increases while the effect on unem-
ployment is ambiguous (Bertola 1990). Giannelli et  al. 
(2012) estimate that in Italy the duration of the first job 
spell of individuals entering the labor market decreased 
after the deregulation reforms (they study the period 
1990–2000) and this effect was not counterbalanced by a 
higher probability of moving quickly to a new employer. 
Furthermore, they observe that “the share of workers 
with only one job spell within 3  years decreases, while 
the share of those with three or more spells increases”. 
The port of entry effect—where temporary jobs lead to 
permanent employment-continued after the reforms but 
became less noticeable, as less than half of workers could 
move to a permanent contract after a series of temporary 
spells (Berton et al. 2011). Temporary jobs may end just 
substituting permanent ones (Kahn 2010). In the context 
of occupational injuries, temporary jobs and precarious 
employment have been found to be associated to higher 
occurrence of injuries (Amuedo-Dorantes 2002; Bender 
et al. 2012; Giraudo et al. 2016; Koranyi et al. 2018) and 
more severe injuries (Picchio and Van Ours 2017) in sev-
eral countries, including Italy. Because the liberalization 
reforms increased the prevalence of job insecurity, it is 
reasonable to expect an overall association with changes 
in employment outcomes of occupational injuries. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies 
that describe variations of injured workers’ subsequent 
employment and patterns of successful “first” RTW in 
the context of new labor market regulation.
2.3  Our hypotheses
Our study contributes to such body of literature to test 
six different hypotheses among Italian injured work-
ers. First, even in an institutional setting where injured 
workers enjoy more protection compared to the one 
examined in North American studies, a “first” RTW is 
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not a stable outcome and workers’ and firms’ character-
istics affect such outcome:
Hp0:  Occupational injuries have a substantial limiting 
effect on long term employment also for workers 
who “first” RTW 
Hp1:  The physical effect of injuries is a very important 
determinant of long term employment outcomes 
but workers’ and firms’ characteristics that are 
potentially associated with a higher likelihood 
of workplace accommodations play also a very 
large role
Furthermore, as described in detail in the section 
below, labor market reforms introduced in Italy in the 
late 1990s affected firms differently depending on spe-
cific firms’ attributes such as size and unionization. 
Therefore,
Hp2:  The probability of keeping the pre-injury job after 
a first RTW was reduced for workers who were 
employed in firms where EPL decreased due to 
labor law reforms
Second, we know that a worker’ high wage is likely to 
indicate her level of human capital, as well as produc-
tivity, effort, dedication to the job, and overall value to 
the firm’s production process. Therefore, higher wages 
might also imply a higher probability or staying in the 
same firm in the medium-long run after RTW, despite 
deregulation of the labor market that would allow the 
firm to dispose of the worker more easily. Therefore, we 
test the following hypothesis:
Hp3:  Compared to low wage workers, high wage work-
ers were more likely to secure their pre-injury 
employment relationship in the medium-long 
run even if EPL was reduced
On the other hand, workers who had suffered more 
serious injuries may be less employable, e.g. because of 
functional limitations due to the accident. It is an open 
empirical question whether deregulation of the labor 
market was associated with improvement or worsening 
of their condition. Hence we test:
Hp4:  The reduction in EPL was correlated with worst 
long-term employment outcomes for those 
employees who had suffered more serious injuries
Finally, we know that women and immigrants are 
workers who compose the weaker segments of the labor 
market, e.g. they earn lower wages and are more often 
hired with more precarious contracts (Venturini and 
Villosio 2008; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2008). Hence, we 
test a fourth hypothesis:
Hp5:  The reduction in EPL was correlated with worst 
long-term employment outcomes for the more 
vulnerable employees such as injured women 
and immigrants
To test these hypotheses we study a variety of long 
term employment outcomes: job-security (still holding 
the before-injury job), employment security (no more 
holding the before-injury job but still employed), a more 
precarious job (movements in and out of temporary/per-
manent contracts), unemployment, or new job related 
injuries. We study a 12 years period (1994–2005) during 
which Italy introduced a set of labor market liberalization 
reforms that we illustrate below.
3  Institutional setting
Italian injured workers hired with a permanent contract 
enjoy full job protection until the end of their recovery 
period. However, after their first RTW they are at risk of 
layoffs if no viable accommodation is found, or may quit 
if they cannot cope with job demands. For temporary 
workers the outcome is more uncertain if their contract 
expires before their day of maximum medical improve-
ment. We aim at understanding whether changes in labor 
market regulations may be associated with modifications 
of long run employment outcomes across all these work-
ers. In this paper, we focus on EPL reforms, defining a 
period “before” (1994–1997), a period “during” (1998–
2001) and a period “after” (2002–2005) such reforms. In 
the following section, we describe these reforms and the 
institutional settings, as well as some additional changes 
introduced in those years that affected both Work-
ers’ Compensation rules and welfare provisions for the 
unemployed.
3.1  Employment protection legislation and liberalization 
reforms
In the initial period that we study (1994–1997), the typi-
cal labor market contract for an Italian worker was a 
“permanent” one, i.e. a contract with no stated termi-
nation date and implying significant firing costs for the 
employer in case of not-consensual termination. Such 
firing costs included severance payments and compensa-
tion in case of unfair dismissal. They increased with firm 
size in correspondence of two legal thresholds, one at 15 
and another one at 60 employees (Cavaletto and Pacelli 
2014). In addition, unionization typically increases with 
firm size, making layoffs more conflictual, lengthier and 
costlier for larger employers. Until the late 1990s, the 
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only departures from the typical permanent contracts 
were apprenticeships and on-the-job-training con-
tracts for youth. Temporary contracts were very limited 
and subject to strict constraints: each firm faced lim-
its in the number of temporary employees it could hire 
and was required to prove the temporary nature of the 
occupation.
Labor market liberalization reforms were concentrated 
between 1998 and 2001. Reforms started in 1998 (Law 
Decree No. 196/1997) and introduced and regulated new 
types of work (such as temporary agency work and quasi-
dependent work2). They continued in 2000 (Law Decree 
No. 61/2000) deregulating part-time contracts. Finally, in 
2001 we saw the full liberalization of temporary contracts 
(Law Decree No. 368/2001). Now they could last a few 
days or up to 36 months, became renewable and faced no 
restrictions on their use. Afterward, only law Decree No. 
276/2003 modified the EPL setting but did not introduce 
substantial novelties. Further and deeper reforms took 
place after 2008 but they are excluded from our analysis 
since their effects were largely affected by the macro-
economic recession. We should mention that the public 
sector did not undergo most of the reforms we discussed 
here. Instead, it faced a prolonged hiring freeze. Because 
of this difference, we exclude public employees from the 
current study.
All these were reforms “at the margin”, decreasing EPL 
for new entrants on the labor market and for job mov-
ers, but not for incumbent workers who kept their open 
ended job. However, while small firms faced very low EPL 
even before the reforms were introduced, larger firms 
took advantage of them to decrease the average EPL of 
their workforce by expanding new hires with flexible 
contracts, and by enjoying stronger bargaining power 
(Ciminelli et al. 2018).
The effect of the reforms became rapidly visible, as 
non-permanent contract workers in the private sector 
increased from 600,000 in the first quarter of 1998 to about 
1.2 million in the first quarter of 2006 (Eurostat 2018).
3.2  Workers’ compensation
In Italy, a public insurance system provides medical and 
disability benefits to all employees, both permanent and 
temporary workers, to all self-employed manual work-
ers and to a part of non-manual self-employed workers. 
Those excluded from the public system—mostly self-
employed workers in the trade sector—have to resort to 
the private insurance sector (but they do not have the 
obligation to do so).3 The public system is managed by 
the National Workers’ Compensation Agency (INAIL), 
and is financed by firms through premiums that are 
proportional to payroll, increase with jobs risk, and are 
adjusted through experience rating. Workers who get 
injured are entitled to a recovery period, the length of 
which is established by a doctor who is certified to work 
for INAIL. They receive paid medical care directly or 
indirectly provided by INAIL, and disability benefits 
ranging from 60 to 75% of their earnings. However, a top-
up granted by employers according to collective agree-
ments allows injured employees to earn a de-facto full 
wage replacement during their absence from work (Gal-
izzi et  al. 2016). The worker compensation system was 
the object of only minor adjustments in the last decades. 
The only relevant reform was delivered in 2000 (DLgs 
38/2000). It introduced coverage also for incidents occur-
ring on the way to or from work,4 a compensation for the 
so called “biological damage” (Rossi 2002), and modified 
injury severity thresholds that entitle injured workers to 
permanent disability (PPD) benefits. PPD is measured 
on a 0–100% scale and is set by the law in a very detailed 
way. Before the 2000 reform, workers with a PPD up to 
10% (e.g. a fracture of the atlas without persistent neu-
rological symptoms) did not receive any compensation 
after the completion of the healing period, while over the 
10% threshold an annuity was paid compensating for long 
term income losses. The 2000 reform increased the gen-
erosity of the workers’ compensation PPD benefits: the 
threshold without compensation was lowered to 5% (e.g. 
a detectable scar, not visible on the face or neck); from 6 
to 15% a lump sum compensating not the income losses 
but the biological damage is now paid according to the 
severity, the gender and the age of the worker5; above the 
15% threshold the compensation is paid with an annuity, 
and pays for both the biological- and income loss.6
3.3  Unemployment benefits
Up to 2005 the system assisting workers who lost their 
job was highly segmented. Workers laid off by larger 
(above 15 employees) manufacturing firms through col-
lective bargaining (involving 5 or more employees) could 
enjoy generous “mobility benefits”:  compensation up 
to 75% of their wage for up to 4  years according to age 
and area of work. All other unemployed individuals were 
2 Formally “self-employment” this is a de facto subordinate employment rela-
tionship. It is similar to a free-lance job and might be called also contract-
work.
3 All self-employed workers are excluded from our analysis.
4 Such incidents in itinere are excluded from our analysis, as they were unob-
servable up to 2000.
5 For example, a fracture of the atlas with 10% PPD would grant a lump sum 
of 21,700 euro—about 1 year of average salary—for a man under 20 years 
of age.
6 Such annuity increases with the degree of PPD: from less than 2 months 
of average salary to more than 1 year of average salary for a PPD equal to 
100%.
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compensated by a system of unemployment benefits that 
was poorly endowed, provided only a 30% replacement 
rate for 6 months (40% for up to 9 months starting from 
2001) and was subject to strict eligibility conditions on 
past employment7; overall, it was characterized by very 
low take-up rates and did not reach the minimum stand-
ards set by the 1952 ILO Social Security Convention until 
2008 (Leombruni et al. 2012).
4  Study population and methods
4.1  Data
We use a database that combines individual employment 
histories from the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) 
with injuries records from INAIL, the Italian National 
Workers’ Compensation Agency. The matched database 
is a 1:15 random sample of the population (about 1.5 mil-
lion workers each year) covering the period 1994–2012, 
generating a unique source of information for the analy-
sis of occupational injuries.
WHIP’s reference population includes all Italian work-
ers and pensioners. It excludes only public sector employ-
ees hired with an open-ended contract and high skilled 
professions (e.g., lawyers) who are compensated with dif-
ferent insurance funds. The dependent employment sec-
tion of WHIP is a matched employer-employee database 
that includes start and end dates of each employment 
spell, as well as worker characteristics (age, sex, place of 
birth), job characteristics (temporary vs. permanent con-
tract, full-time vs. part-time, occupation, location), labor 
market outcomes (the number of days and weeks worked, 
earnings and social security payments) and firm charac-
teristics (size, opening and closing date, sector, location, 
monthly new hires and separations, average wages).
INAIL data include a description of all injuries caus-
ing permanent or temporary disabilities across the whole 
country and with time off work longer than 3 days. The 
data records a description of the injury event itself (when, 
how, where) and its consequences (nature of injury, part 
of body, length of temporary disability payment, and 
degree of permanent disability—if any).
The INAIL dataset and the WHIP dependent employ-
ment section have been matched and this is the dataset 
on which we base our analysis (see Bena et al. 2012, and 
Galizzi et al. 2016, for further details).8
4.2  Sample selection
For the purpose of this work, we select only employees 
who had a work incident between 1994 and 2005. As 
we observe outcomes up to 3  years after their recovery 
period this brings us at the beginning of the economic 
crisis in 2008. After that year, the Italian macroeconomic 
environment was deeply affected by the consequences of 
the financial crisis, and became less comparable to the 
previous decade.
We drop fatal events and injuries occurring on the 
way to or from work (as they were not compensated and 
therefore recorded before 2000), as well as those occur-
ring in agriculture (where many are self-employed), and 
in education, health and personal services (which are 
mainly public sectors for which we do not have corre-
sponding WHIP data).
As in most studies concerning injured workers, a seri-
ous concern is the issue of underreporting of injuries 
(Boden and Ozonoff 2008; Picchio and Van Ours 2017), 
mainly from small establishments (Wuellner et al. 2016; 
Oleinick et  al. 1995). Indeed, smaller firms have higher 
ability to under-report less severe injuries because gov-
ernments’ health and safety controls are less frequently 
implemented among small firms. Furthermore, the addi-
tional insurance costs generated by an incident can be 
more significant for a small business and induce a larger 
incentive to underreport (evidence on Italy is provided in 
Galizzi et  al. 2016). For our study, such concern is par-
ticularly relevant because it entails a potential bias in our 
estimations. As we described above, firm size modifies 
the degree of EPL, so that the estimated effect of the latter 
can be blurred by underreporting. Therefore, we exploit 
the information on the nature of incidents to study only 
injuries which usually require immediate treatments at 
a hospital (fractures, anatomic losses and removals of an 
alien corpus). By implementing this restriction we limit 
the likelihood of an underreporting bias because hospi-
tals are required to report injuries to INAIL.
Our final sample includes about 29,000 incidents for 
27,442 workers. The sample composition does not change 
in a relevant way over the years we study with respect to 
8 Our study did not require ethics review and approval. In fact, the data 
we use has been listed under the Italian National Statistical Program that 
includes data-collection projects that comply with the national regulation 
on all issues regarding the use of personal data. The data has been positively 
evaluated by the Italian authority that is responsible to guarantee and pro-
tect privacy.
7 Such conditions were: sector of activity (mostly manufacturing firms), at 
least 2 years of past employment, and at least 1 year of paid contributions over 
the last 2 years. As a result, the take up rate was very low.
Please notice that in case of acceptance for publication, we will not be able 
to directly provide the dataset we used because the data owner is the Italian 
Ministry of Health, and we had access to it according to a strict confiden-
tiality agreement. The data can be accessed by any researcher establishing 
a specific research agreement with the Italian Ministry of Health, however. 
We are obviously ready to provide information to guide other researchers 
through the procedures for accessing the data on injuries. Please also notice 
that all the results and descriptive statistics only related to the labor mar-
ket—e.g. work contracts or wages—can be easily replicated with publicly 
accessible datasets also based on INPS archives (e.g. LOSAI, distributed by 
the Italian Ministry of Welfare). The copies of the computer programs used 
to generate the results presented in the paper are available from the authors.
Footnote 8 (continued)
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the part of body affected and to the nature of injury, but 
for a 4 p.p. increase in the prevalence of fractures, from 
48.9% before the reforms to 53% after them (see Table 2).
4.3  Measures of RTW outcomes
The outcome we analyze is the work status of the per-
son n months (up to 36 months) after what we call their 
“first” RTW.9 We face no right censoring, as the database 
covers the period up to 2012.
The outcomes we consider are: non-work, employed in 
the pre-injury firm, employed in a different firm with a 
permanent contract, employed in a different firm with a 
temporary contract,10 on leave because of a new injury. 
Unconditional probabilities (Table 1) show that the most 
likely outcome was maintaining the pre-injury job. How-
ever, such probability was far below 100% across all three 
periods and decreases as time since recovery passes. 
Non-work was the second most likely outcome (Hp0). 
Regardless of time period, it affected almost one-fourth 
of injured workers and increased over time.
4.4  Statistical analysis
To test Hp1 we estimate a standard multinomial logit 
model of the probability of different employment out-
comes at different intervals (12 and 36 months) after the 
“first” RTW, where yi takes values j = 0 for non-work, 
j = 1 if employed in the pre-injury firm, j = 2 if employed 
in a different firm with a permanent contract, j = 3 if 
employed in a different firm with a temporary contract, 
j = 4 if on leave because of a new incident (hence K = 5):
(1)Prob
(
yi = j
)
=
ebjXi
1+
∑K−1
k=0 e
bkXi
Table 1 Unconditional probabilities of post injury long term employment outcomes
Among those who were hired pre-injury with a permanent contract, only 1.7, 1.4 and 0.8% (in the three periods respectively) became temporary contract workers in 
the same firm—out of all possible outcomes. Among those who were hired pre-injury with a temporary contract in the same three periods, 18.2%, 15.2% and 12.6% 
became permanent contract workers in the same firm—out of all possible outcomes
1994–1997 Outcome after n months since RTW 
3 months 6 months 12 months 36 months
Non work 15.0 14.7 16.9 25.4
Employed in the same firm 79.9 76.9 69.2 48.5
Employed in a different firm-permanent contract 3.7 6.2 10.6 19.5
Employed in a different firm-temporary contract 1.0 1.6 2.6 5.9
On leave due to a new_injury 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1998–2001 3 months 6 months 12 months 36 months
Non work 14.9 13.8 15.1 24.1
Employed in the same firm 78.1 75.1 67.2 46.8
Employed in a different firm-permanent contract 4.3 7.2 11.3 19.9
employed in a Different firm-temporary contract 2.2 3.4 5.7 8.5
On leave due to a new_injury 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2002–2005 3 months 6 months 12 months  36 months
Non work 15.4 14.1 15.2 23.0
Employed in the same firm 77.9 74.9 67.7 48.6
Employed in a different firm-permanent contract 3.6 5.7 9.5 17.0
Employed in a different firm-temporary contract 2.8 4.6 6.9 11.2
On leave due to a new_injury 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
9 This is what is known as the day of “Maximum Medical Improvement” and 
is often used as a RTW measure in the literature. As we mentioned before,in 
the case of all Italian permanent contract this day coincides with the day of 
RTW because employees return to their previous job by law. However, Ital-
ian temporary contract workers can be unemployed upon return if their 
contract expires before the end of their healing period. In this latter case our 
data measure the employment outcome n months after the recovery period. 
We cannot identify these cases. This is unfortunate because injured workers 
in temporary contracts were a small portion of our injured population, but a 
portion that doubled (form 8 to 16%) over the 10 years we study. 10 Fixed term, free-lance, training or apprentice contracts.
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We then examine how probabilities changed during and 
after the labor market reforms for workers characterized 
by different pre-injury EPL and HC, i.e. we interact the 
covariates of interest with the three reform periods. We 
define a set of dummies D = {D1,D2,D3} signaling respec-
tively periods “before” (1994–1997), “during” (1998–
2001) and “after” (2002–2005) market liberalization 
reforms. Not all covariates X are actually interacted with 
D(although most of them are, as explained in the empiri-
cal section); hence the estimated regressors in Eq. (1) can 
be further decomposed as bjXi = gjZi ∗ D + hjWi.
Given our research hypotheses the covariates of main 
interest are the following.
 (i) A measure of EPL (log of the number of employees 
in the firm11) as firm size is highly related to firing 
costs and union protection to test Hp2.
 (ii) A measure of human capital (log of 1-year-lagged 
real daily wage) capturing individual productivity, 
status and labor market value to test Hp3.
 (iii) A measure of injury severity (log of days off work) 
to investigate whether more seriously injured 
employees experienced different employment out-
comes before and after the reforms to test Hp4.
Table 2 Summary statistics
As explained in the text, we study only injuries which require immediate treatments at a hospital (fractures, anatomic losses and removals of an alien corpus)
Period Statistic 1994–1997 1998–2001 2002–2005
Lagged real daily wage Mean 62.89 62.3 61.55
Wage above the mean wage by occupation in the 
firm
Share 0.27 0.25 0.25
Past intermittent spells Mean 0.42 0.51 0.5
Number of employees in the firm Median 25.08 23.33 22.33
Growing firms Share 0.39 0.44 0.43
Shrinking firms Share 0.25 0.24 0.23
Firm age Mean 15.86 16.18 16.58
Excess turnover Mean 0.31 0.33 0.32
Past illness rate Mean 0.18 0.18 0.19
Years of experience plus firm tenure Mean 7.17 8.19 9.1
Female Share 0.08 0.09 0.09
Temporary contract Share 0.08 0.14 0.16
Part time Share 0.02 0.03 0.05
Migrants Share 0.1 0.17 0.26
Manual occupation Share 0.94 0.93 0.93
Worker’s age Mean 36.7 36.93 37.96
Unemployment rate Mean 7.65 6.5 5.44
North-west Share 0.31 0.33 0.33
North east Share 0.28 0.29 0.28
Center Share 0.17 0.18 0.17
South Share 0.24 0.21 0.22
Manufacturing Share 57.36 53.77 48.5
Construction Share 21.8 20.09 24.14
Services Share 20.85 26.14 27.36
Fracture Share 48.9 52.95 52.99
Anatomic loss Share 8.58 7.87 8.65
Alien corpus Share 42.53 39.18 38.36
Trunk Share 0.3 0.3 0.3
Head Share 25.1 32.5 33.1
Back Share 8.1 9.5 7.7
Lower extremities Share 19.2 19.9 21.2
Upper extremities Share 37.3 37.8 37.9
Days off work after the injury Mean 57.00 62.21 65.76
11 Head-count of individuals on the firm payroll, averaged over the calendar 
year.
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We add several controls to capture pre-injury indi-
vidual health (workers’ past illness rate and age), pro-
pensity to change jobs (past intermittent employment 
spells,12 and total work experience13), as well as firm’s 
propensity to establish long-term employment relation-
ships (excess turnover14). All these controls are interacted 
with the period (pre, during, after the reforms) as they 
might be correlated with the institutional environment, 
so that conditional on period they can provide the rela-
tive importance of each of these factors. The role of these 
controls is to separate the variables of main interest (firm 
size, wage) from the effect of observable heterogeneity in 
workers’ health and attitudes and firms’ policies.
We also include further regressors that we do not 
interact with periods but believe could be important 
determinant of successful RTW such as demographic 
characteristics. We include a measure of the rela-
tive “importance” of the individual worker to the firm: 
whether her pre-injury wages was above the mean wage 
of other workers employed at the same time, in the 
same occupation and in the same firm; whether they 
were employed part time, or performing manual tasks. 
We include information about outcomes that are clearly 
related to injury severity and affect subsequent employ-
ment: the nature of the injury (in our case limited to frac-
tures, anatomic losses and removals of an alien corpus), 
and whether the injury had resulted in a severe perma-
nent partial disability (PPD), (PPD rating > 17%). Finally, 
we account for the business cycle: industrial sectors, 
geographical areas, and regional unemployment rate by 
gender, as well as firm’s experienced growth or decline in 
employment. Last, we add firm’s age as a proxy for its sta-
bility over time.
Summary statistics of all our covariates, calculated 
by time periods D, are presented in Table 2. Notice that 
males and manual workers are the vast majority of our 
sample, as we are focusing on individuals employed in 
occupations highly exposed to the risk of incidents. The 
most notable changes across the time periods are the 
increase in the number of immigrants (an increase of 16 
percent point over 10  years) and the decline in unem-
ployment rate, as the business cycle slowly improves from 
the recession of early 1990s to the recovery or early 2000. 
Also, time off work after the injury lengthens. Finally, the 
percent of temporary workers in our sample of injured 
workers increases from 8% in the first period, to 14% in 
the second and 16% in the third. Over the same period 
temporary workers as percentage of the total number of 
Italian employees were 7.5%, 9.5% and 10.9% (Eurostat 
2018).
Finally, we stratify our analysis by type of employ-
ment contract, i.e. we estimate our models including and 
excluding temporary contract workers, to assess whether 
the liberalization reforms affected them differently. We 
do so to describe the patterns of “first” RTW outcomes 
both across all employees (regardless of pre injury con-
tractual status) and only for permanent contract workers. 
The goal is to cast some light on the hypothesis that the 
overall RTW patterns we detect were driven mainly by 
the more flexible part of the work force. For the same rea-
son we also stratify by gender and by nationality, to cast 
more light on the outcomes for most vulnerable workers 
(Hp. 5).15 We present our main results from the multino-
mial logit model plotting the conditional probabilities of 
the different outcomes in different periods:
where n indicates one of the three periods, X_ indicates 
the set of all X excluding  Zm, and  Zm can refer to individ-
ual wage, firm size or length of absence due to the inci-
dent, and a indicates a specific value (usually a quartile) 
of  Zm. When we estimate Eq. (2) we set the values of vari-
ables X_ at their sample average.
Then, Hp2 can be written as
i.e. in a firm facing EPL reduction due to the reform 
(large firm), the probability of keeping the pre-injury job 
(outcome 1) in the pre-reform period (period 1) is larger 
than in the post-reform period (period 3).
Hp3 can be written as
i.e. for a worker earning a low wage, the probability of 
keeping the pre-injury job (outcome 1) in the pre-reform 
period (period 1) is larger than in the post-reform period 
(period 3).
Analog inequalities can be written for the other 
hypotheses.
(2)Prob
(
y = j|D = Dn,Zm = a,X−
)
Prob
(
y = 1|D = D1, firmsize = large,X−
)
> Prob
(
y = 1|D = D3, firmsize = large,X−
)
Prob
(
y = 1|D = D1,wage = low,X−
)
> Prob
(
y = 1|D = D3,wage = low,X−
)
15 When not stratified, we add to the model controls for gender and national-
ity as well.
12 We count one change for workers who went from employment to unem-
ployment, two changes if they went from employment to unemployment to 
employment again and so on. We then divide the total number of changes by 
the total number of pre-injury quarters.
13 Past experience plus firm tenure, in days—at the day of the accident.
14 Gross worker turnover minus (absolute value of ) job creation at the firm 
level. This measures a firm’s propensity to keep or rotate its workforce.
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5  Results
Estimated conditional probabilities of each outcome at 1 
and 3  years after the “first” RTW (Table  3) confirm the 
picture previously suggested by the unconditional prob-
abilities (Table 1). The reforms were not associated with 
changes in the average probability of remaining with the 
pre-injury firm and this remained by far the most likely 
long term employment outcome. At the same time, the 
probability of non-work decreased at the start of the 
reform (after period 1), but new employment became less 
secure. In fact, the probability of getting a new job with 
a permanent contract decreased after the completion of 
the reform (after period 2), and that of getting a tempo-
rary contract in another firm increased significantly in 
every period and roughly doubled after 36 months. Being 
off work because of a new work related injury remained 
an extremely unlikely event that was not influenced by 
the reforms. Therefore, we will not further discuss the 
results about this very last outcome.
5.1  Determinants of employment patterns
Our first goal is to test whether the above discussed 
trends are influenced by firm, individual, and injury char-
acteristics. Table 4 presents our results regarding employ-
ment outcomes 1 year after a “first” RTW.16 In terms of 
demographic characteristic, gender is not associated with 
a higher likelihood of leaving employment and foreigners 
are actually more likely to continue working. We would 
expect older workers to recover less quickly from inju-
ries but, at the same time, employers to be more willing 
to accommodate workers who are longterm employees 
of the firm. Infact, we find that older workers are more 
likely to either stop working or to remain employed 
with the pre injury employer. Indeed, consistently with 
human capital theory, over the 10 years we study, higher 
past experience (general human capital) and lower past 
mobility (specific human capital, as measured by inter-
mittencies in past career) help individuals in securing the 
pre-injury job; both effects become stronger during and 
after the reforms. High wage workers (during and after 
the reform), and workers with higher wage compared 
to their coworkers, are less likely to be unemployed or 
to move to a flexible contract. This could indicate that 
employers are more willing to invest in accommoda-
tions for higher productivity or higher status employees. 
Table 3 Conditional probabilities of outcomes 1 and 3 years after “first” RTW 
Reference outcome: employed at same pre injury firm. Stata 15 commands: margins. Standard errors: delta method
1 year 3 years
Margin Std. Err. [90% Conf. Interval] Margin Std. Err. [90% Conf. Interval]
No work No work
1994–1997 0.153 0.004 0.147 0.160 1994–1997 0.240 0.005 0.232 0.247
1998–2001 0.137 0.004 0.131 0.143 1998–2001 0.230 0.004 0.222 0.237
2002–2005 0.141 0.004 0.135 0.148 2002–2005 0.220 0.005 0.212 0.227
Same firm Same firm
1994–1997 0.710 0.005 0.702 0.718 1994–1997 0.503 0.005 0.494 0.512
1998–2001 0.699 0.005 0.691 0.706 1998–2001 0.493 0.005 0.485 0.501
2002–2005 0.700 0.005 0.692 0.708 2002–2005 0.502 0.005 0.494 0.511
Other perm Other perm
1994–1997 0.106 0.004 0.100 0.112 1994–1997 0.195 0.004 0.188 0.202
1998–2001 0.107 0.003 0.102 0.112 1998–2001 0.194 0.004 0.187 0.200
2002–2005 0.089 0.003 0.084 0.094 2002–2005 0.168 0.004 0.162 0.175
Other temp Other temp
1994–1997 0.024 0.002 0.021 0.026 1994–1997 0.055 0.002 0.051 0.059
1998–2001 0.050 0.002 0.046 0.054 1998–2001 0.076 0.003 0.072 0.081
2002–2005 0.063 0.003 0.058 0.067 2002–2005 0.108 0.004 0.102 0.113
New injury New injury
1994–1997 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.009 1994–1997 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.008
1998–2001 0.008 0.001 0.006 0.009 1998–2001 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.009
2002–2005 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.009 2002–2005 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003
16 Full estimation results for the 3 years period are available upon request. We 
also ran estimation to test the significance of periods’ differences. We included 
separate dummies for the three reforms periods. Results did not change (see 
Additional file 1: Table S1).
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Table 4 Multinomial logit model of employment outcomes 1 year after “first” RTW (all workers)
Not working Employed at other firm, 
permanent contract
Employed at other firm, 
temporary contract
New Injury 
related absence
Female − 0.143 − 0.244** 0.196 0.259
Migrant − 0.129** 0.191*** 0.151* − 0.128
ln (age) 1.039*** − 0.339*** − 1.264*** 0.905***
Period = 1 × lagged real daily wage − 0.081 0.099 − 0.292 − 0.735*
Period = 2 × lagged real daily wage − 0.478*** − 0.141 − 0.720*** − 0.489
Period = 3 × lagged real daily wage − 0.604*** − 0.239* − 0.920*** − 0.458
Wage above the firm’s mean wage − 0.099** − 0.012 − 0.218** − 0.386**
Part time 0.17 0.171 − 0.114 − 1.207
Manual occupation − 0.025 0.304*** 0.502*** 0.743
Period = 1 × ln (total experience) − 0.707*** − 0.181*** − 0.565*** − 0.095
Period = 2 × ln (total experience) − 0.545*** − 0.077 − 0.333*** − 0.264
Period = 3 × ln (total experience) − 0.486*** − 0.095* − 0.225*** − 0.350**
Period = 1 × past intermittent emp. spells 1.047* 1.786*** 0.842 2.001**
Period = 2 × past intermittent emp. spells 1.010* 1.363** 1.195** 0.759
Period = 3 × past intermittent emp. spells 1.715*** 2.732*** 2.501*** 1.703
Period = 1 × past illness rate 0.049 0.370* − 0.253 1.463***
Period = 2 × past illness rate 0.540*** 0.249 0.734*** 1.818***
Period = 3 × past illness rate 0.374** 0.525** 0.649*** 1.554***
Period = 1 × ln (days off after 1st injury) 0.308*** 0.106*** 0.186** 0.032
Period = 2 × ln (days off after 1st injury) 0.284*** 0.140*** 0.151*** 0.037
Period = 3 × ln (days off after 1st injury) 0.285*** 0.102*** 0.131*** 0.132
Permanent damage > 17% 0.475*** 0.098 − 0.159 0.325
Alien corpus 0.404*** 0.051 0.248** 0.462*
Fracture 0 0 0 0
Anatomic loss − 0.116 − 0.087 − 0.11 − 0.599
ln (firm age) − 0.132*** − 0.191*** − 0.166*** − 0.054
Period = 1 × ln (firm size) − 0.082*** − 0.163*** − 0.117*** 0.001
Period = 2 × ln (firm size) − 0.028 − 0.103*** 0.059** 0.082
Period = 3 × ln (firm size) 0.001 − 0.03 0.103*** 0.094**
Growing firm 0.252*** 0.342*** 0.418*** − 0.089
Shrinking firm 0.689*** 0.962*** 0.900*** 0.263
Period = 1 × firm excess turnover 0.478*** 0.551*** 0.535*** − 0.505
Period = 2 × firm excess turnover 0.716*** 0.492*** 0.860*** − 0.125
Period = 3 × firm excess turnover 0.678*** 0.623*** 0.928*** 0.411
Manufacturing 0 0 0 0
Constructions 0.411*** 0.410*** 0.191** − 0.053
Services 0.082 0.392*** 0.256*** 0.187
North west 0 0 0 0
North east − 0.110** − 0.01 0.002 0.115
Center − 0.07 − 0.127* 0.094 0.386*
South − 0.062 − 0.233** 0.073 0.569
Unemployment rate 0.024*** − 0.004 − 0.034** − 0.038
Constant − 0.884** − 0.311 5.402*** − 5.297***
Reference outcome: employed at same preinjury firm. Stata 15 commands: mlogit
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Viceversa, manual workers seem to be more “disposable”, 
less able to maintain their pre injury job. The same seems 
true for individuals employed in constructions and in 
services, with construction workers much more likely to 
stop working after a “first” RTW. Past illnesses increase 
the likelihood of being unemployed, or of being employed 
with a flexible contract, but only during and after the 
reforms. As expected, more severe injuries jeopardize a 
successful RTW: injuries resulting in a severe permanent 
disability (above the 17% rating that entitles workers to 
permanent annuity payments benefits) are more likely to 
lead to no work, and injuries that required a longer time 
to recover are clearly associated with both a much higher 
likelihood of stop working or of separating from the pre-
injury employer.
As far as firms are concerned, we find that larger and 
older companies guarantee more employment continu-
ity to their injured workers, while workers are less likely 
to maintain jobs with firms that were either growing 
or shrinking. Being employed in a high turnover firm 
decreases the likelihood of keeping the pre-injury job, 
with no noticeable changes across periods.
This first set of results is consistent with our Hp1. It 
confirms the role played by the direct physical effect of 
injuries but suggests also the important role played by 
workers’ characteristics and firms’ ability and willingness 
to accommodate their injured employees after the first—
and for permanent workers guaranteed—RTW.
To better describe how these findings vary over the 
10 years we study, we are performing also a comparison 
between the differential degree of “protection” provided 
by being employed in very small, small or large organi-
zations, and how this differential degrees of protection 
changed in different reform periods (as for Hp2);  or a 
comparison between the differential degree of “protec-
tion” provided by enjoying a low, average or high endow-
ment of human capital, and how this differential degree 
of protection changed in different reform periods17 (as 
for Hp3). We also want to explore whether the estimated 
probabilities change by severity of the injury (as for 
Hp4), gender, and nationality (as for Hp5), and whether 
results vary by pre-injury contract type. We use our main 
estimation results from the multinomial logit model 
(Table 4) to plot the conditional probabilities of the dif-
ferent employment outcomes in different periods and for 
different values of the covariates of interest, as specified 
in Eq  (2). In the following figures we look at the slopes 
of the marginal effects of covariates over time, as they 
indicate the conditional probability of outcome j at values 
a = {a1, a2,a3} of the covariate of interest Z over time, i.e. 
as the reforms develop.
5.2  Role of employment protection legislation and human 
capital
Figure  1 (“Conditional probability of outcomes after one 
year since RTW, by firm size (10, 100, 1000 employees”) 
plots how the conditional probabilities of our four main 
RTW outcomes changed over the three reforms periods 
and varied in correspondence of the size of the firm that 
was employing the worker when the incident occurred. 
We show only results for outcomes 1 year after the “first” 
RTW but the ones for 3  years after are substantially 
equivalent (see Additional file  1: Figure S4). Each line 
refers to a given firm size representative of small, medium 
and large Italian firms.18 The model is estimated on a 
continuous measure of firm size. Here we compute the 
predicted probabilities of outcomes (marginal effects) at 
arbitrary19 values of firm size (10, 100 and 1000 employ-
ees) chosen to be representative of different EPL settings 
caused by the legal provisions for compensation in case 
of unfair dismissal, or the likely presence of unions: small 
firms (10 employees) below the lower legal threshold (set 
at 15 employees in a single local unit or a local area20); 
medium size firms (100 employees) above the upper 
legal threshold (set at 60 employees considering all local 
units and local areas); large and usually unionized firms 
(1000 employees). Lines plot these margins over time 
and permit us to describe how the “advantage” of being 
employed in a large firm changed over time.
We find that pre-injury employment at a larger firm did 
no longer secure a job in the same firm after the reforms 
started: the conditional probability of keeping the pre-
injury job was higher in large firms before the reforms 
(period 1) but the “size protection” effect disappeared 
after the reforms (period 3). Consistently the conditional 
probability of non-work was higher in smaller firms, but 
becomes not significantly different across firm sizes after 
the reforms, while the likelihood of finding a new job 
with only a temporary contract increases across all firms 
sizes.
19 The same holds for wage in the next sub section.
20 The number of employees is a noisy measure of the legal threshold 
because such thresholds are defined by law not simply as a head count but 
with a set of cumbersome rules. Therefore, we prefer to assess changes 
around sizes that are clearly above or below the thresholds of 15 and 60 
employees.
17 Our estimations show that there were no changes in these differential 
degrees of protection before the reform started in 1998. See Additional file 1: 
Figure S1. We also conducted separate analyses by industrial sectors. Results 
do not change and are available upon request. We thank an anonymous ref-
eree for suggesting these controls.
18 Average firm size is very small in Italy, as about one-third of private sector 
workers are employed in firms with less than 15 employees.
Page 13 of 24Galizzi et al. J Labour Market Res            (2019) 53:9 
As discussed above, labor market deregulation focused 
on the creation of new more flexible temporary contacts, 
but ended up affecting the whole labor market function-
ing and shifted the bargaining power away from work-
ers, regardless of their contractual status (Ciminelli 
et  al. 2018). However, it is still possible that the results 
concerning the probability of remaining in the same firm 
hide differences in RTW success by pre-injury workers’ 
contractual status. It is plausible that injured workers may 
benefit of more firm’s good will and accommodations if 
originally hired with a permanent and not a temporary 
contract. To test this hypothesis, we also run our esti-
mation after removing workers who had been working 
with a temporary contract at the time of the injury. We 
find that the conditional probability of remaining in the 
same firm for permanent contract workers only (about 
90% of all workers in our sample) remains higher in cor-
respondence of larger firm size, and does not change with 
the reforms. Hence, related to Hp2, we can conclude that 
being in a large firm does no longer guarantee job protec-
tion after the reforms only to those injured workers who 
were hired with a temporary contract at the time of the 
injury, despite that fact that the possibility of post injury 
accommodation should increase with size (Fig. 2: “Condi-
tional probability of outcomes after one year since RTW, 
permanent contract workers only, by firm size (10, 100, 
1000 employees)”). Results still hold after 3 years (Addi-
tional file 1: Figure S5).
We focus now on wages as a measure of human capi-
tal accumulation that could protect workers, as for Hp3. 
Figure  3 (“Conditional probability of outcomes after one 
year since RTW, by (real daily) wage quartiles (50, 60, 70 
euro)”) is analogous to the previous ones and shows con-
ditional probabilities in correspondence of the first, sec-
ond and third quartile of the real wage distribution (50, 
60 and 70 euro per day). It shows that, as the reforms 
were introduced, workers with lower pre-injury wages 
became clearly less protected against labor market lib-
eralization: they faced decreasing probability of remain-
ing in their pre-injury firm, ended up with relative higher 
probability of no-work, and faced a higher likelihood of 
moving to a new firm under an only temporary contract 
(although differences are not strongly significant). Results 
after 3 years are similar, and statistical significance related 
to the probability of keeping the pre-injury job increases; 
the association of the reforms with the probability of no-
work becomes milder (Additional file 1: Figure S6).
This time the results do not change when we limit 
our analysis to employees who were under permanent 
contracts when injured (Fig.  4: “Conditional probability 
of outcomes after one year since RTW, permanent con-
tract workers only, by (real daily) wage quartiles (50, 60, 
70 euro)”). The conditional probabilities of keeping the 
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Fig. 1 Conditional probability of outcomes after 1 year since RTW by firm size (10, 100, 1000 employees). 90% confidence intervals. Firm size 10 
employees: solid lines; firm size 100 employees: dash lines; firm size 1000 employees: dotted lines
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Fig. 2 Conditional probability of outcomes after 1 year since RTW, permanent contract workers only, by firm size (10, 100, 1000 employees). 90% 
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pre-injury job were not different by wage quartile before 
the reforms, but afterward they are different (although 
differences are not strongly significant). This holds after 
3 years as well (Additional file 1: Figure S7) and is consist-
ent with our Hp3.
Therefore, our first conclusion is that reforms21 were 
associated with changes in successful long term employ-
ment outcomes. Such outcomes became less linked with 
national employment protection rules, potential union 
protection, and firm’s accommodation (linked to firm 
size),  to become more a function of individual’s human 
capital (as measured by wage). Such results confirm our 
first two hypotheses. Notice that—as discussed above—
our estimates (see as an example Table 4) control for (1) 
the individual propensity to move (number of pre-injury 
employment spells, interacted with periods), (2) total 
individual labor market experience (pre-injury days of 
employment, interacted with periods), and (3) firm’s pro-
pensity not to invest in long-term relationships with the 
workforce (excess firm turnover interacted with periods). 
All these regressors have the expected sign—(1) and (3) 
decrease the probability to stay, (2) increases it—although 
the estimated values tend to increase during and after the 
reform periods.
5.3  Severity of the injury
When we focus on the role played by the severity of injury 
(captured bythe length of the spell off work), we find that 
more severe injuries were associated with lower condi-
tional probability of keeping the pre injury job and higher 
conditional probability of non-work after 1  year (Fig.  5: 
“Conditional probability of outcomes after one year since 
RTW, by quartiles of number of days off after injury (9, 
40, 80 days)”). Surprisingly, none of the patters we study 
are correlated with the reform as lines remain pretty 
much parallel. The same outcome arises after 3 years (not 
reported). It is important to recall that our analysis con-
trols also for other measures of general health (age, the 
annual frequency of pre-injury sick leaves, nature of the 
injury, and degree of potential PPD caused by the injury). 
All these regressors were also interacted with periods and 
we did not find significant interactions.
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Fig. 4 Conditional probability of outcomes after 1 year since RTW, permanent contract workers only, by (real daily) wage quartiles (50, 60, 70 euro). 
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21 It is important to notice that, as discussed above a 2000 reform changed 
the compensation rules for PPD cases. The increased generosity of the system 
after 2000 may have increased the reservation wage and modified the labour 
supply of PPD workers, possibly reducing their labour force participation 
after the injury. As for the demand side, both before and after the 2000 reform 
employers remain entitled to legitimately lay off PPD workers only if they 
can prove that no accommodation can be provided within the firm. In gen-
eral firms do not bear the immediate monetary costs of their PPD employees’ 
compensation, so we do not expect a distortionary effect of 2000 law on our 
results. However, to check our results against the 2000 change in the compen-
sation system, we performed a robustness check of our main findings exclud-
ing PPD workers from the analysis (Additional file 1: Figures S2, S3). Results 
did not change. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this check.
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Hence, our findings describe that the likelihood of 
different long-term employment outcomes by work-
ers’ injury severity was not associated with the reforms. 
Workers who were more vulnerable because of their 
worst injury experience did not experience a change in 
their probability of successful RTW over the reforms 
period we study. This contradicts our Hp. 4. However, it 
is important to notice that one more time, we observe a 
striking increase in the overall likelihood of landing on a 
new temporary job over the reforms period.
5.4  Women and migrants
To test our fourth hypothesis, we analyze our main 
results separately in the case of women and immigrants 
only. It is important to recall that the share of immigrants 
in our sample increased from 10 to 17% and to 26% over 
the three periods while the share of women remained 
stable around 9%. Among women, temporary con-
tracts increased more than in the whole sample,22 from 
8%, to 19%, to 20% in the three periods considered; the 
same holds for immigrants, among which they increased 
from 8% to 16% to 19%. Notice however that the smaller 
sample size decreases the precision of the estimates with 
respect to the whole sample.
We focus on the conditional probability of keeping the 
pre-injury job after 1 year, for the sake of clarity and brev-
ity. In Fig.  6 (“Conditional probability of staying in the 
same firm at one year, by firm size (10, 100, 1000 employ-
ees) and by (real daily) wage quartiles (50, 60, 70 euro)”) 
we see that for both women and immigrants (regard-
less of contract type) the probability of remaining in the 
same firm flips after the reforms and becomes negatively 
related to firm size, showing a worsening of their long 
term employment outcomes during the reforms period 
compared to the whole population of injured work-
ers (compare with Fig.  1). For immigrants, this process 
started as soon as the reforms rolled in (period 2); for 
women, as the reforms were completed (period 3). Both 
women and immigrants show the same pattern of the 
full sample with respect to the protective effect of high 
wages.
If, again, we exclude those working with a temporary 
contract at the time of the injury (Fig.  7: “Conditional 
probability of staying in the same firm at one year, by firm 
size (10, 100, 1000 employees) and by (real daily) wage 
quartiles (50, 60, 70 euro). Permanent contract workers 
only”), we see that—as in the whole sample—the effect 
related to wages is unchanged. However, the protective 
effect of firm size for permanent contract workers tends 
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22 As shown in Table 2, in the whole sample the share of temporary contracts 
increased from 9% to 14% to 16%.
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to fade away, during the reforms for migrants and after 
the reforms for women. This association may suggest that 
larger firms took advantage of the liberalization reforms 
to reduce the share of injured women and migrants on 
their payroll with a temporary contract and also of those 
they had previously hired with a permanent contract. 
This supports our Hp. 5, i.e. worsening employment out-
comes for injured women and immigrants during and 
after the introduction of the reforms..
Finally, with respect to the severity of the incident and 
the consequent length of the absence, results related to 
women and immigrants are unchanged with respect to 
the whole sample (not reported): one more time reforms 
were found to be unrelated to the subsequent probability 
of non-work for injuries of different severities.
5.5  Comparison of injured vs. non injured workers
To better assess the implications of our findings, we 
should compare the observed employment outcomes 
for injured workers with the ones of Italian workers who 
did not experience an occupational incident. However, 
such direct comparison is not straightforward because 
we are focusing on a very specific subset of the popula-
tion of workers (i.e. those more exposed to the risk of a 
work incident) and we study their employment experi-
ence after a quite relevant health shock (i.e. an injury that 
required immediate care). A counterfactual situation (i.e. 
workers exposed to a similar risk of a work injury but who 
did not experience it) cannot be easily found in the gen-
eral working population, since a measure of occupational 
risk exposure is not reported in our data. Hence, the two 
comparison groups (injured vs not injured) are composed 
of potentially very different individuals according to their 
observable and unobservable characteristics. Based on 
what we can observe in our WHIP data,23 the general 
working population (in not-agricultural private firms) is 
composed by more women, fewer migrants, fewer man-
ual workers, and higher wage earners with respect to our 
sample of workers employed in more risky occupations 
(described in Table 2). The general working population is 
also exposed to the risk of a work incident for a shorter 
time: in fact, they have higher rates of part-time and less 
average work experience. All this would imply a quite dif-
ferent career path for our injured workers compared to 
non-injured employees regardless of the occurrence of a 
shock like a work incident.
Hence, following Fadlon and Nielsen (2017), we look 
for a more appropriate comparison. Our comparison 
group is drawn from the same sample of injured work-
ers used in the main analysis, but is selected only among 
those who will face a work accident later in time. Here we 
are assuming that they all come from the same popula-
tion of workers at risk, and that the time of the accident is 
random. In Fadlon and Nielsen’s words (page 10) we “[…] 
compare households [workers in our case] with the same 
expectations over the distribution of future paths, but 
with different realizations, to isolate the unanticipated 
component of the shock […] exploiting the potential ran-
domness of the timing of a severe […] health shock within 
a short period of time.” Those authors proceed to estimate 
a proper impact evaluation applying a difference in differ-
ences strategy. However, the aim of our research is differ-
ent, because we do not focus on the outcomes per se as 
they did, but on whether the consequences of the actual 
occurrence of an incident are associated with changes in 
the institutional setting of the labor market. In particular, 
we are interested on how the probability of the different 
outcomes is affected by covariates like firm size or indi-
vidual wages and how the effect of such regressors varied 
over the reform period. Therefore, we replicate the analy-
sis as in the previous figures (e.g. Fig. 1) and we compare 
the displayed patterns over the different reform periods. 
Finally, we use the estimated conditional probabilities to 
mimic a difference in differences comparison.
To be more specific, we proceed as follows. First, we 
attribute to not-yet-injured workers a random date of 
“pretend injury” and a random duration of “pretend 
leave”, so that the distributions in the true and pretend 
injured samples are as similar as possible both in terms 
of time off work and tenure at the time of the incident 
(Additional file  1: Figures  S10, S11). We impose that 
the “pretend date of injury” and “pretend day of “first” 
RTW” happen more than 1 year before the calendar day 
of the actual injury, so that we always measure their out-
comes before the actual injury occurs. Unfortunately, in 
this case the sample size for period 3 (after the reforms) 
becomes quite small, because of the right censoring of 
work incident data at December 2005; estimates are less 
reliable for that period, hence we must focus mainly on 
periods before and during the reforms.
In terms of unconditional probabilities we calculate 
that our “not yet/pretend injured workers” face a much 
lower probability of no-work with respect to actual 
injured ones, and a higher probability of keeping their 
pre-injury job across the first two periods (Table 5). This 
seems to suggest a clear vulnerability of injured workers 
when the incident actually occurs.
Such general finding is confirmed when we replicate 
our multinomial logit analysis for the “not yet/pretend” 
injured group and plot again the conditional probabili-
ties of the different outcomes in different periods (Fig. 8: 
““Not yet injured/pretend” injured workers:  Conditional 
probabilities of staying in the same firm or not working 23 Results available under request.
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one year after “pretend” RTW, by firm size (10, 100, 1000 
employees)—first row—and by (real daily) wage quartiles 
(50, 60, 70 euro)—second row”; and Additional file 1: Fig-
ures S12, S13, S14, S15). We notice that over the reforms 
period (period 2) the “not yet/pretend” injured workers 
employed in small firms increase their probability to stay 
in the same firm one year after the imputed incident.24 
This was not the case for the actual injured workers (back 
in Fig.  1). In addition the estimated probabilities of not 
working 1 year after the imputed incident day were much 
lower for workers in each firms size compared, again, to 
what was estimated for the real injured ones (Fig. 1). “Not 
yet/pretend” injured workers who earned low, median 
and high wages also increased their probability to stay 
in the same firm and decreased their probability of no-
work during the reforms. Instead, the probability to stay 
in the same firm was decreasing among actually injured 
low wage workers, and it stayed constant for median 
and high wage ones; among actually injured workers the 
probability of no-work decreased, but to a lesser extent 
among low wage workers (see Fig. 3).
Finally, we use the point estimates and confidence 
intervals of the conditional probabilities of staying in the 
same firm, as in Figs.  1, 3, 8, and mimic a difference in 
differences comparison, without any possibility to verify 
the common trend assumption. However, we believe 
such assumption should hold because before period 1 
both groups are “not yet injured”. In Table 6 we note that 
actually injured workers suffer larger penalties in terms of 
the likelihood of remaining in the same firm 1 year after 
a “first” RTW, especially if they were employed in small 
firms and earned lower pre injury wages. This suggests 
that reforms were associated with a worsening of the 
conditions of the actually injured workers compared to 
the not injured ones because their longer term employ-
ment prospects became more uncertain.
6  Discussion and conclusions
The Italian labor market underwent a sequence of dra-
matic reforms between 1998 and 2001. Their goal was to 
increase labor market flexibility and, as a consequence, 
produce greater employment. New rules facilitated the 
creation of both more numerous and new types of flex-
ible contracts. However, they ended up affecting the 
functioning of the whole labor market by eroding the 
bargaining power of all workers, including the ones 
hired with permanent contracts (Ciminelli et  al. 2018). 
Our study describes the long term employment experi-
ence of injured workers during years when such reforms 
were introduced. Our data indicate that continuous work 
with the pre-injury employer remained the most com-
mon employment outcome for injured workers 1  year 
or 3 years after a “first” RTW. However, this was true for 
only around 70% (after 1 year) and 50% (after 3 years) of 
injured workers and such percentages remained overall 
stable before, during, and after reform periods. The sec-
ond most common outcome, non-work, became a bit less 
frequent. Before the reform 25% of injured workers were 
no longer employed 3 years after their “first” RTW. After 
the reform this percentage decreased to 23%. More work-
ers kept working but with a different employer and a tem-
porary contract (from 6% before the reform to 11% after 
the reforms).
We estimate a multinomial logit model that accounts 
for individual, firm and injury characteristics as determi-
nant of the different employment outcomes we observe. 
Our results are consistent with what shown by North 
American studies (Butler et al. 1995) despite the fact that 
we are studying a system with stronger institutional pro-
tections for injured workers. We find that injury severity 
was a main determinant of long term employment out-
comes. At the same time, our measures of human capital 
Table 5 Comparison of  unconditional probabilities 
of  outcomes for  “true” injured vs. “not yet/pretend” 
injured workers 1 year after “first” RTW 
True Pretend-not 
yet injured
Injury in period 1-before 1994–1997
 Non work 16.9 9.0
 Employed in the same firm 69.2 75.6
 Employed in a different firm-permanent contract 10.6 10.9
 Employed in a different firm-temporary contract 2.6 3.7
 On leave due to a new_injury 0.8 0.9
 Total 100.0 100.0
Injury in period 2-during 1998–2001
 Non work 15.1 8.3
 Employed in the same firm 67.2 70.3
 Employed in a different firm-permanent contract 11.3 11.8
 Employed in a different firm-temporary contract 5.7 8.7
 On leave due to a new_injury 0.8 1.0
 Total 100.0 100.0
Injury in period 3-after 2002–2005
 Non work 15.2 7.9
 Employed in the same firm 67.7 67.5
 Employed in a different firm-permanent contract 9.5 12.1
 Employed in a different firm-temporary contract 6.9 12.0
 On leave due to a new_injury 0.7 0.5
 Total 100.0 100.0
24 Results on only permanent contract workers disappear by firm size and are 
unchanged by wage, as in the sample of actual injured workers (see Additional 
file 1).
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accumulation (wages, relative wage status, labor market 
experience, employment stability) and of potential firms 
stability and ability to provide accommodations (stable 
employment, and size) were strong predictors of the most 
successful long term employment outcomes, i.e. ability 
to maintain employment with the preinjury employer. 
In addition, our estimations suggest that labor market 
liberalization reforms were associated with higher like-
lihood of maintaining employment after the injury and 
the “first” RTW. However, this happened at the expense 
of future job security: injured workers found more easily 
jobs with new employers, but fewer jobs with permanent 
contracts.
From previous studies we know that reforms weak-
ened the employment protection that Italian workers 
had historically enjoyed when hired by larger firms, who 
face higher firing costs, stronger union representation, 
and likely offer more accommodations to the injured. 
We investigate whether specific firm and individual 
attributes offered “protection” from the potential desta-
bilizing effects of the reforms. Contrary to the common 
expectation about women’s weaker attachment to the 
labor force, we find that injured women were not more 
likely than men to stop working after a “first” RTW (as 
was already observed in Butler et  al. 1995). We observe 
also that after the reforms, workers who were injured in 
larger establishments did not enjoy any longer a higher 
probability of long-term successful RTW (conditional 
on wages and the other controls), both in terms of their 
ability to keep their job with the pre-injury firms and in 
terms of losing employment (no work). Such loss of over-
all employment protection associated with firms’ size was 
driven by the most vulnerable workers: the ones who at 
the time of the injury were already hired with flexible 
contracts (males or females), or the ones who were immi-
grants, even if hired with a permanent contract. This sug-
gests that the traditionally more vulnerable workers were 
also the ones for whom the disadvantage in post-injury 
long term employment outcomes were amplified during 
the reforms. Liberalization gave employers more lee-
way in terms of decreasing any long-term commitment 
toward these employees with further implications for 
social inequality (Gebel and Giesecke 2009; Barbieri and 
Cutuli 2016.)
At the same time, our results confirm the importance 
of higher pre-injury wages (conditional on firm size and 
the other controls), in securing successful long-term 
employment. Previous research had already shown 
that higher wage workers are the more likely to return 
to work sooner after an incident (Galizzi et  al. 2016). 
Given the same labor market experience, higher wage 
may proxy more successful investment in human capital 
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and, therefore, a higher productivity that employers do 
not want to lose. Or it may signal higher worker’s sta-
tus within the company, another characteristic that may 
lead to higher likelihood of receiving accommodation by 
employers. The findings of our current study suggest that 
such factors are determinant also of successful employ-
ment outcomes over the long run despite the potential 
higher flexibility introduced by reforms. Our estimates 
show that only high wage workers kept being more likely 
to maintain their job with the pre-injury employer, or to 
avoid non work or a temporary contract if they changed 
employer one or 3  years after their “first” RTW, even if 
they were women or immigrants.
Finally, we find that workers with a higher degree of 
permanent disability were clearly more likely to stop 
working overtime. Workers who took long time to 
recover from the injury were also more likely to separate 
from the preinjury employer. However, we do not observe 
any  changes in such trends over the three periods we 
observe. Clearly, the worst the injury, the bigger the chal-
lenges across all the employment outcomes we studied. 
However, liberalization of the labor market was associ-
ated with neither worsened nor improved employment 
outcomes 1/3  years after the day of maximum medical 
improvement across the different levels of injury severity.
We acknowledge that our study has limitations. 
Because the reforms were introduced gradually and at 
times of additional institutional changes, we cannot 
implement a clear before-after policy evaluations design 
to provide clear evidence of a causal impact of the lib-
eralization. Furthermore, our data is quite rich in terms 
of recorded workers’, firms’, and injuries’ characteristics, 
but it does not permit us to compare the experience 
of injured workers with the ones of similar workers 
employed, for example, in the same occupation and in 
the same firms. This limits our ability to establish clearly 
whether the reforms were associated with different out-
comes for injured and non-injured employees. However, 
the comparison exercise we conducted using “not yet 
injured workers” as a comparison group suggests that 
during and after the reforms employment uncertainty 
may have increased more for injured workers than for the 
non-injured ones. This is clearly an area that should be 
further tested with different data sets.
Our study represents also only a first step in our effort 
to describe how injured workers well-being may change 
over a period when labor market reforms are introduced. 
We assess our outcomes mainly in terms of job/employ-
ment security, but other dimensions of job quality such 
as wages, job title, and full vs. part time status are also 
very important dimensions of employment quality, and 
they deserve further analysis. Although our measures of 
long term employment outcomes enrich the ones used 
in previous studies by considering also the degree of job 
security attached to new employment contracts, we are 
aware that it remains an imperfect measure of poten-
tial success. Individuals differ in their needs, desires and 
aspirations. Therefore, a RTW on a job that is less secure 
but pays better or promises immediate or future pro-
motions may be a preferable outcome to certain injured 
workers (Young 2014). Similarly, to certain individuals a 
temporary job that comes with more interesting duties, 
or with flexible time, could be more desirable than a 
more structured, permanent but less flexible job (Krause 
Table 6 Difference in  differences measure of  conditional probabilities of  outcomes (remaining with  same employer) 1 
year after “first” RTW 
Size Period T/C Margin 90% confidence interval Wage Period T/C Margin 90% confidence interval
Small 2 T 0.689 0.680 0.698 Low 2 T 0.690 0.682 0.699
Small 1 T 0.687 0.677 0.696 Low 1 T 0.712 0.702 0.721
Small 2 C 0.756 0.749 0.763 Low 2 C 0.762 0.755 0.768
Small 1 C 0.731 0.726 0.737 Low 1 C 0.759 0.755 0.764
DID − 0.022 − 0.020 − 0.024 DID − 0.024 − 0.021 − 0.026
Medium 2 T 0.710 0.702 0.719 Median 2 T 0.702 0.694 0.709
Medium 1 T 0.740 0.730 0.749 Median 1 T 0.712 0.704 0.720
Medium 2 C 0.769 0.762 0.776 Median 2 C 0.768 0.761 0.774
Medium 1 C 0.794 0.789 0.800 Median 1 C 0.760 0.755 0.765
DID − 0.004 − 0.002 − 0.006 DID − 0.018 − 0.016 − 0.020
Large 2 T 0.727 0.712 0.742 High 2 T 0.714 0.705 0.724
Large 1 T 0.785 0.770 0.799 High 1 T 0.712 0.703 0.722
Large 2 C 0.781 0.769 0.793 High 2 C 0.774 0.767 0.782
Large 1 C 0.845 0.837 0.854 High 1 C 0.761 0.754 0.767
DID 0.006 0.009 0.004 DID − 0.012 − 0.010 − 0.013
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et al. 2001; Berecki-Gisolf et al. 2012; Young et al. 2005b; 
Leyshon and Shaw 2012). Finally, a RTW to a secure job 
may still be not successful if the worker keeps experienc-
ing physical or mental health limitations (Bültmann et al. 
2007). These are job dimensions and workers’ preferences 
that cannot be captured by our administrative data and 
will require survey or qualitative data.
Despite such limitations, our study provides new evi-
dence that policies aiming at improving RTW need to 
focus also on interventions that will affect a “successful” 
RTW, i.e. long term employment. Almost one-fourth 
of our Italian injured workers were no longer working 
3  years after a “first” RTW. This calls for incentives to 
induce firms to accommodate not only their most valu-
able (high wage, high status, long experience) employ-
ees but also the most “disposable” ones. In addition, we 
provide original evidence that the outcomes of occupa-
tional injuries do not happen in a vacuum, and are not 
only affected by workers’ compensation, disability, or 
human resource policies. They are correlated also with 
the more general rules that affect each country labor 
market. This implies that policies regulating the experi-
ence of injured workers need to be aware that their final 
effect is likely to depend on a much wider set of national 
or sectoral labor market regulations that will strengthen 
or weaken the “protective” effect of specific firms or 
individual attributes. At the same time, general labor 
market policies reforms cannot forget how they will end 
up framing the experiences of some of the less visible, 
but more vulnerable workers, such as the ones who car-
ried already the burden of an occupational injury.
Our findings show that labor market liberalization 
policies were associated with changes in outcomes for 
all injured workers, regardless of their pre-injury con-
tractual status. During and after the reforms were intro-
duced such workers found easier to find new—but less 
secure– employment. This has very important implica-
tions. Temporary contracts have been found to have a 
negative effect on productivity (Lisi and Malo 2017). Fur-
thermore, there is evidence that more insecure jobs are 
associated with higher frequency and severity of injuries 
(Amuedo-Dorantes 2002; Guadalupe 2003; Fabiano et al. 
2008; Bender et  al. 2012; Picchio and Van Ours 2017) 
and, more generally, higher risk of poor health, of future 
sickness absences, and of larger use of health services 
(László et al. 2010). All these negative consequences are 
likely to be amplified for a person who already suffered 
an injury and ends up being reemployed in a more inse-
cure job. Therefore, workers’ compensation policies and 
labor market liberalization policies need to be highly 
coordinated to avoid severe unintended consequences as 
higher costs caused by new lost production and medical 
expenses.
Additional file
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estimations; display of the conditional probabilities of outcomes 3 years 
after the “first” RTW; display of the probabilities of “no work” for women 
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of selected characteristics and outcomes between truly injured and 
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